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Abstract I argue that there is a distinction to be drawn between two kinds of mental
realism, and I draw some lessons for the realism-antirealism debate. Although it is already
at hand, the distinction has not yet been drawn clearly. The difference to be shown consists
in what realism is about: it may be either about the interpretation of folk psychology, or the
ontology of mental entities. I specify the commitment to the fact-stating character of the
discourse as the central component of realism about folk psychology, and from this I
separate realism about mental entities as an ontological commitment towards them. I point
out that the two views are mutually independent, which provides the possibility of con-
sidering folk psychology as not being in cognitive competition with scientific psychology.
At the end I make a tentative suggestion as to how to interpret the former in order to avoid
this conflict.
Keywords Factualism  Folk psychology  Mental realism  Mental fictionalism 
Ontological commitment
To the memory of Peter Lipton.
1 Introduction
Our instinctive psychological ontology is realist: in our sober, i.e. not philosophical,
moments we hardly doubt that we have mental states. If looked at a bit more philosoph-
ically, however, we do not say very much by saying this, and what we say is far from clear.
‘Not very much’ because we do not really say what this thing our realism is about, and we
do not say clearly in what sense we are talking about realism. Dummett (1991: 4) thinks
that the debates about realism are unequivocal from at least the realist angle:
These are problems about whether or not we should take a realist attitude to this or
that class of entity. In any one instance, realism is a definite doctrine. Its denial, by
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contrast may take any one of numerous possible forms, each of which is a variety of
anti-realism concerning the given subject matter: the colourless term ‘anti-realism’ is
apt as a signal in that it denotes not a specific philosophical doctrine but the rejection
of a doctrine.
Millikan (1986: 194) is even stricter when she claims that there is only one possible form
of both realism and anti-realism. In this paper I intend to show that mental realism is far
less definite than we might think from reading Dummett or Millikan: in this context there
are at least two possible and distinct realist positions. And whilst this paper focuses on
mental realism, its lessons can be generalised to the realism/anti-realism debate.
The two senses of realism can be distinguished thus: in one sense, ‘realism’ is an
ontological commitment to a class of entities. According to this sense of mental realism the
list of existing entities contains mental states, properties, objects, attributes, substances,
etc.—depending on our substantive metaphysics. In the other sense, ‘realism’ may mean
the realist interpretation of a discourse. In the present case this is the view that folk
psychology is a fact-stating discourse. Being an interpretation, this kind of realism, which
can also be labelled as factualism, does not necessarily entail any attitude towards the
existence of mental entities.
The difference here is between two views of what the realist attitude is about: it may be
about how things are in some region of the world, or about how to interpret discourses on a
purported region of the world. This brings about important differences in the content of the
respective realist positions. They are not mutually exclusive, but they do not come hand in
hand. As we will see, a realist interpretation of folk psychology may end up in realism
about mental entities, if it is combined with the conviction that folk psychology gives a true
description of the mental region of the world. But the two kinds of realism are, never-
theless, independent—it is possible to be a realist about mental entities without interpreting
folk psychology realistically. And vice versa: it is possible to interpret folk psychology in a
realist way without being a realist about mental entities.
2 Non-Differentiating Positions
To be a common-sense mental realist is to think of mental states as existing in accordance
with a literal reading of folk psychology. This commitment is fairly widespread among
philosophers of mind too. When they talk about mental realism, philosophers are fre-
quently committed the claim that mental states have representational and/or causal prop-
erties. To think that this is part of mental realism is to overlook the important distinction I
introduced above. Therefore I call these positions non-differentiating: they do not help us
to see the difference between two kinds of mental realism.
According to Kim (e.g. 1995: 202; 1998: 79, 90), to acknowledge mental properties as
active parts of the causal structure of the world, i.e. to accept them as causes and effects, is
essential in mental realism. This approach seems to echo a causal identity criterion of
properties (cf. Shoemaker 1980): properties are individuated by their causal powers, thus
the existence of a property can be granted only if it contributes to events. This can be read
in two ways, at least. On the one hand, it can be read as a verificationist criterion stipulating
that properties exist only when some causal power can be discovered. This ontology may
be appealing: it prevents us from postulating mystical properties, and entitles empirical
research to reveal what properties there are in the world. But this is a shortcoming at the
same time, as it allows us to acknowledge only those properties that are at least in principle
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accessible from a human standpoint—and it is far from obvious that there are only
properties and powers of this kind in the world. Human cognition is limited by human
cognitive capacities, and thus not even the fiction of an ideal science can save this reading
as long as it remains human science.
On the other hand, the criterion can be read without the shortcomings of a verificationist
reading. One can say that the concept of ‘property’ entails that of ‘causal power’. If property
is analysed thus, it is a conceptual necessity that, if there are mental properties, they must be
causally efficacious. In this case the burden is on the analysis of ‘property’ and not on
empirical research into causal relations. Against this background it seems to follow that if
we want to be mental realists, we have to acknowledge the existence of mental properties
that are causally efficacious by conceptual necessity. By this analysis we implicitly attach a
substantive metaphysics to the common-sense view of the discourse which holds that mental
states are properties of agents—in some robust sense to be specified by an ontology of
properties that takes ‘causal power’ to be central in the analysis of ‘property’.
But in fact, as we shall see soon, this commitment should not be central in any form of
mental realism. It puts unnecessary restrictions on it: it makes it necessary to see causal
powers working behind ascriptions of mental states. This excludes epiphenomenalist
positions, for which mental states are not causally efficacious but inert shadows of causally
efficacious processes of a different kind. Epiphenomenalists thus take folk psychology to
describe a region of the world, but maintain that its causal idiom is merely apparent; there
are no real causal processes underlying it. Thus, despite interpreting folk psychology as a
descriptive discourse, they deny the causal efficacy of mental states. And this does not
seem to be incoherent: the question of causal efficacy belongs not to the interpretation of
the discourse, but to a metaphysics pertaining to the nature of mental states.
This metaphysics is logically secondary: it can come only after we are committed to a
realist interpretation of the discourse. We can discuss the causal efficacy of mental states
only if we agree first that folk psychology describes some region of the world, with which
causal powers may or may not be associated. One has to be a realist about the interpretation
of folk psychology prior to asking if mental states postulated by it are causally efficacious.
Therefore it is not appropriate to deny that epiphenomenalists are realists merely because
they reject causal powers—and here the label ‘realist’ may concern either mental entities
or the interpretation of folk psychology. We can say at most, if we accept the causal
analysis of ‘property’, that epiphenomenalists do not think of mental entities as properties,
but as something else, depending on the ontological categories that they accept.
Let us take one step further. Fodor (1985) gives a definition of realism about propo-
sitional attitudes that consists of two components. For Fodor a realist thinks that (a)
propositional attitudes are causally efficacious as specified by the laws or platitudes of folk
psychology, and (b) they are semantically evaluable. The first may be partly familiar from
Kim, but it contains a novelty, namely that it requires causal efficacy in accordance with
the platitudes of folk psychology. The problem in this respect is that Fodor here seems to
rely on a nomological understanding of causation, which may be appealing, but it is not
clear why mental realism is supposed to rely on it. Even if we accept that a commitment to
causal efficacy is part of mental realism, it does not follow that it should rely on the
nomological model with folk psychological generalisations playing the role of laws.
Alternative theories of causation might do as well.1
1 This could be based on counterfactuals and a realist theory of possible worlds (cf. Lewis 1973a, b). Lynne
Rudder Baker (1995: 154 ff.) tries to give an account of causal efficacy in terms of a counterfactual-based
theory.
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The first component of Fodor’s definition is motivated by an influential account of
folk psychology which poses special problems for him. Fodor here seems to share the
view that folk psychology is a theory consisting of law-like empirical generalisations.
Why should realism about propositional attitudes be influenced by this view? Our psy-
chological practice can be conceived as being based not on some theory, but instead on
our empathic abilities, thanks to which we can put ourselves into the position of others in
our imagination, simulate their mental states and draw conclusions concerning possible
behaviour. Thus causal efficacy belongs to mental states not as specified by folk psy-
chological theory but by our decision-making mechanisms: while applying psychological
concepts we do not deploy a theory, but a heuristics, thus it makes sense to say that
causal laws are not part of mental realism. By accepting this our realist commitments are
not threatened, we do not have to doubt that the mental region of the world is the way
folk psychology describes it—merely that it relies on a theory consisting of law-like
empirical generalisations.
Fodor’s second criterion is problematic because it is tautological. If there are prop-
ositional attitudes then they are semantically evaluable by conceptual necessity, as
propositions are semantically evaluable. And as it does not make sense to say that there
are semantically non-evaluable propositions (these would not be propositions at all), nor
does it make sense to say that there are semantically non-evaluable propositional
attitudes.
This problem has further implications. The criterion is not merely empty; it can come
close to a definition of mental realism only if we accept that folk psychology represents the
bulk of our mental states as having propositional content. But it makes sense to say that
although we talk in terms of propositional attitudes, in reality our mental states are not like
that; they may be, as Dennett (e.g. 1981: 53) has it, like the centre of gravity of a triangle,
i.e. calculation-bound abstract entities:
The center of gravity is just an abstractum. It is just a fictional object. But when I say
it is a fictional object, I do not mean to disparage it; it is a wonderful fictional object,
and it has a perfectly legitimate place within serious, sober, echt physical science.
(Dennett 1992: 104)
Attitudes exist, as Dennett (e.g. 1981: 53; Dennett 1987b: 37) himself is willing to admit,
but they do not exist the way folk psychology represents them. His realism is not
compromised by this, as he acknowledges mental entities as components of the world; he
just denies that folk psychology gives a literally true description of the mental region—it
gives a true description, but our mental states are not what they seem to be at first
glance.
Clearly, Fodor’s and Kim’s causal criterion is part of the common-sense view, although
Fodor’s law-like generalisations may not be. It is also clear that semantic evaluation is also
part of it. But these components are logically independent. We can interpret folk psy-
chology in a realist way without accepting either a causal or a semantic criterion. For
Fodor, being a realist about folk psychology is to accept it as literally true, and for him the
consequences of giving up this kind of realism are intolerable (Fodor 1989: 77). But this
could hardly be the key to the realist interpretation of folk psychology, as we have just
seen: epiphenomenalists can sensibly deny the causal criterion while holding that they are
still realist about folk psychology, their realism being merely of a different kind. Dennett
can say something similar while denying the criterion of semantic evaluation. What is then
to be realist about folk psychology?
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3 Realism About Folk Psychology
It is possible to give a definition of realism about folk psychology that might be acceptable
to those mentioned above. Kim’s and Fodor’s realism can be taken to commit us to the
existence of a specific property. If we take folk-psychological predicates to express specific
properties, then we are realists about folk psychology in the spirit of the common-sense
view of the discourse. But this seems to be too restrictive; realism does not require this
much. It requires only that there be some properties of the agent that can make folk-
psychological propositions true. In Dennett’s case one can say that there are properties of a
triangle, allowing for the calculation of its centre of gravity, which can make the calcu-
lation true. Similarly, attitude ascriptions can be calculated and can be true: mental states
are calculated by reference to patterns of the agent’s behaviour.
These abstract properties are not part of the world in the same way that observable
physical properties are, but this is not even necessary for a realist interpretation of the
discourse about them. As John Heil (1999: 200) points out correctly:
Realism about a given predicate, ‘U’, requires only that ‘U’ applies truly to objects in
virtue of properties actually possessed by those objects. Realism does not require that
‘U’ designate a property shared by every object to which it truly applies.2
The case is similar with epiphenomenalism: either we allow causally inert properties, or, if
we insist on the causal analysis of ‘property’, we say that mental state ascriptions describe
causally inert epiphenomena of causally efficacious processes. Thus, the common ground
can be put this way: mental state ascriptions can be true in virtue of the agent’s real
properties—without further restrictions on the number or nature of the properties in
question.
This said, we have not yet agreed on the meaning of realism about folk psychology. The
central claim of realism about any kind of discourse is frequently put forward as a con-
junction of two theses (cf. Wright 2002: 207):
1. semantic thesis: the statements in the discourse have a content representing aspects of
the real world;
2. metaphysical thesis: the real world is furnished with facts that these statements can
represent.
This is the core of the positions discussed above: folk psychology is a descriptive discourse
representing some existing aspects of the world.
It seems possible, however, to give a realist interpretation of a class of statements
without accepting that there are facts to be suitably represented in the discourse—i.e. it is
possible to deny the metaphysical thesis while maintaining a realist interpretation of the
discourse. This is to say that given the nature of the discourse it conforms to the semantic
claim (i.e. it aims at a true representation of some aspects of the world), but the real world
does not contain facts that the statements could represent. Realism construed in this way is
an attitude concerning the proper interpretation of the discourse—a view about its nature,
and not about the metaphysics of the facts (allegedly) represented in it. It is thus the
semantic thesis only that is essential for a realist interpretation of any kind of discourse,
and not its conjunction of the metaphysical theses.
2 Boghossian (1990: 157), on the contrary, believes that a realist interpretation of a discourse entails the
commitment that its predicates express real properties. But this seems to me too strong.
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For instance, if we consider that statements in the discourse about witches aspire to
describe some aspects of the world, we may well believe that it fails in this aspiration—
thus we interpret the discourse in a realist way, but take an anti-realist stance towards its
metaphysics. Realist interpretation does not require us to believe that the discourse is true,
and that the world is furnished with facts that the discourse is fitted to represent: it is
enough to believe that the role of the discourse is to represent these putative facts. In the
case of folk psychology, eliminativists (Churchland 1981) hold a position like this. They
think that folk psychology is, by its nature, a fact-stating discourse, an explanatory theory;
but there are no facts in the world that could make its statements true, so folk psychology is
false. Eliminativists reconstruct folk psychology as if it was an empirical theory, a case par
excellence of fact-stating discourses, and argue that it fails to live up to the standards.
As Bas van Fraassen (1980: 11) aptly puts it: a fundamentalist theist, an atheist, and an
agnostic can agree on how to interpret sentences about God or the angels, but they cannot
agree with liberal theologians who hold that these sentences should not be interpreted lit-
erally. If this casting is carried over to the present context, then Fodor plays the role of a
fundamentalist theist, and eliminativists play that of the atheist: they believe folk psychology
to be fact-stating in a literal sense. The liberal theologian is Dennett, who rejects the literal
reading, but maintains that the discourse is fact-stating in an abstract-calculative sense.
For van Fraassen interpreting a discourse as fact-stating does not amount to realism, as
for him it also entails a commitment to truth. I would rather say that in the previous passages
we met the realist interpretation of folk psychology in three versions. The criterion of
acceptance of a statement follows from the interpretation of the discourse to which it
belongs—in the case of descriptive discourses this criterion is truth. Therefore the inter-
pretation of a discourse is logically prior to the criterion of acceptance for statements in the
discourse, and following our interpretation we can also undertake or withdraw from onto-
logical commitments to the entities postulated in it. The criterion of acceptance depends on
how we look at the discourse in which the statement is made. We accept statements like
‘Sherlock Holmes enjoyed opium’ under very different circumstances if Conan Doyle’s
stories are interpreted as historical chronicles and not as short stories, and our ontological
commitments to the entities postulated in them may be adjusted accordingly.
These three versions of realist interpretation agree that the essential property of folk
psychological ascriptions is their truth conditions picking out states of affairs in the world.
They differ with respect to the prospects of fulfilling these conditions and the nature of the
facts that could fulfil them. This is why we can talk about three versions of realist inter-
pretation. The first of these, Fodor’s, is the strongest one. It maintains that folk psychology
serves to describe the mental constituents of the world as they are, and it succeeds. The
second version, Dennett’s, also maintains that folk psychology aims to describe some facts
that are accessible from a specific calculative stance, and that it succeeds; but its truth-
makers do not reside on the level of the properties ascribed, but on a sub-personal level.
The third version, the eliminativist one, holds that although folk psychology is a
descriptive theory, its function is to state facts, and in this it fails systematically. They are
all realists about folk psychology because they share the view that the discourse is used for
stating facts about the real world, only they judge its success, or the way it succeeds,
differently.
One final question must now be answered in order to understand realism about folk
psychology: what does it mean to say that folk psychology is a fact-stating discourse? This
is to say that folk psychology serves the purposes of true description of some aspects of the
world, and if it succeeds then its truth is grounded in how things are in the world. This is
shared by all three versions: there are functions specifying how folk-psychological
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propositions should map semantically onto the world. These propositions have corre-
spondence truth conditions as their truth is grounded in how things stand. Thus, following
Devitt (1991: 29), we can list the conditions on which the truth of these propositions
depends. If interpreted in a realist way a folk-psychological proposition is true if and only if:
1. the sentence expressing the proposition is well-formed,
2. the entities postulated in it exist,
3. there are proper semantic relations between the discourse and the world.
The realist interpretations can be grouped from this angle too. The first condition is
typically not challenged: the syntax of folk-psychological propositions does not pose a
problem. Fodor’s realism holds that folk-psychological propositions can describe some
region of the world and their structure is a good guide to knowing how things stand in that
region. For Dennett, the structure of propositions is not a good guide, thus he envisions the
relevant semantic relations differently, but believes that these relations hold. Eliminativists
argue that the semantics of folk psychology is that of a fact-stating discourse, its
propositions should semantically map onto entities that make its law-like generalisations
true, but deny that these entities are there in the world.
To sum up this section: realism about a given discourse is a position about its nature—
its function or role in our form of life, logic, Wittgensteinian grammar. A discourse can be
interpreted in various ways. Realist interpretations answer the question about the relation
of world and discourse by saying that it is of a fact-stating character, i.e. its role is to give a
true description, which is acceptable by discourse-independent facts, of a region of the
world. If we share this conviction, we give a realist interpretation of folk psychology. This
is not too restrictive, as the fact-stating character can be reconstructed in various ways. If
we give up this conviction, then we deny that the discourse is descriptive of some region of
the world. Thus we do not expect the discourse to be fitted to represent facts.
4 Realism About Mental Entities
As I indicated in the introduction of this paper, realism about mental entities and about folk
psychology are two distinct positions. The latter is an interpretative stance concerning the
nature of the discourse. Folk psychology is a discourse; realism about it cannot be but a
way of interpreting it—it is thus a semantic doctrine about the content of psychological
propositions. Realism about mental entities is a metaphysical doctrine about the nature of
the world, and as such it is independent of semantic considerations.
Realism about mental entities is an ontological commitment to a region of entities from
which neither semantic nor substantive metaphysical considerations follow. This position
can be put very succinctly as ‘‘Mental entities exist.’’ What they are, what their nature is,
how they work, etc. is not a matter of being realist about them, not a matter of ontological
commitment, but of an empirical hypothesis or speculative metaphysics, depending on
one’s cognitive taste, which is connected to realism only in a contingent way. Thus the
thesis can be expressed more informatively as ‘‘Mental entities exist independently of what
we think about them.’’
As this kind of mental realism says nothing about the nature of the entities acknowl-
edged as existing, it can be represented in various forms from dualism to functionalism, or
even to computational or connectionist approaches—i.e. to approaches incompatible with
the common-sense view of folk psychology. It seems to hold that propositional attitudes
are intentional inner states; computational theories deny that they are intentional but admit
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that they are inner states; Cartesian dualists admit that they are intentional but deny that
they are inner states (i.e. within the body). These theories can be understood as meta-
physical or scientific ‘‘research programmes’’ and realism about mental entities belongs to
their ‘‘hard core’’ (cf. Lakatos 1968).
It is obvious at first sight that realism about mental entities is a philosophically very thin
doctrine: it is easier to tell what it does not mean than to tell what it does. One could almost
say that it is empty: it says only that there exists something, but as it contains no expla-
nation of what ‘mental entity’ means, we have not the slightest idea of what this thing, of
which we say that it exists, might be. This realism, it may seem, is precisely of the kind for
which, as Goodman (1978: 20) might say, it is ‘‘not worth fighting for.’’ Taking a closer
look, however, reveals implications that give it a real philosophical value.
For instance, it does not require us to be able to represent the entities of the putative
region. Quite possibly, we may never achieve full knowledge of them, e.g. because they
are entities more complex than a single theory could handle, or because our limited
cognitive capacities inhibit access to some relevant facts about them. Given that, there is
no guarantee that our folk psychology contains even only a part of what can be known
about the mental. But taking an ontological commitment to mental entities urges us to
inquire into the question of what they might be—that is why it belongs to the hard core of
various research programmes on the mental: realism about mental entities is logically prior
to any kind of research into their nature.
This kind of realism does not treat folk-psychological concepts as constitutive in the
meaning of ‘mental’. It does not, of course, exclude the mental being what is represented
by folk psychology, but this may not be due to conceptual necessity. It allows for an
understanding of the mental from outside folk psychology: e.g. cognitive science may
have the last word on what mental entities actually are. It is probably empirical research,
and not conceptual analysis or speculative metaphysics, that tells us how things are in the
world.
Accordingly, realism about mental entities may be taken to be the position starting from
which empirical investigation and theory construction become feasible. From this per-
spective it makes sense to say with Lycan (1988: 31 f.) that mental entities belong to
natural kinds that we do not have sound enough knowledge of, and whose nature is
supposed to be revealed by further empirical research. Folk psychology may provide initial
contingent, and thus possibly false, descriptions of entities to start with, but it has no
special importance beyond that. In this case the conceptual resources of folk psychology
are not privileged in the explanation of human behaviour and cognitive functioning. If we
go this way, our folk-psychological vocabulary can face three possible fates. Empirical
research may vindicate the common-sense view of folk psychology; it may revise it,
thereby giving psychological concepts a technical content; or it may introduce novel
technical concepts more suited to the purpose of further empirical research.
The last two options are not only alien to the common-sense of the discourse but also to
our folk-psychological practice. From this angle, it does not seem sensible to say that the
concept ‘mental’ can be cut out of the texture of psychological concepts because by doing
so we detach it from common usage and start talking about the mental not in its everyday
meaning but in a technical sense—we no longer speak the language of folk psychology but
of something else. A view like this is shared by those who believe that folk-psychological
concepts are constitutive of the ‘mental’: if we do not talk this way we do not talk about the
mental (cf. Pettit and McDowell 1986: 3). Giving it up entails a revision of our anthro-
pology based on folk psychology to a significant degree. For instance, we should withdraw
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from the deeply-rooted idea that due to privileged access we are the best placed to know
how things stand in our own mental world.
But this may be tolerated, and seems less irritating if one considers the historical
character of folk psychology. Our ideas about the mental, pace Churchland (1981),
underwent substantial change over the centuries from Homer to Jane Austen and onwards to
Freud. In Homer there is no real mental life: Achilles’s thought takes place in public,
personality, thought and action are not separate categories, the idea of a private inner world
as we know it today is absent (cf. Havelock 1963: 199).3 In comparison with this, our image
of the mental is substantially different. If we accept that Homer applies psychological
concepts in a way typical of his age, then either there was then no mental life in which the
idea of a privileged access could make sense and it appeared later, or we do not have it yet.
This suggests that the question about the nature of the mental invites an a posteriori answer,
the first step towards which is an ontological commitment to mental entities.
It is thus clear that realism about mental entities is not an empty position free from
consequences. Making an ontological commitment creates the possibility of searching for
empirical findings about how things are with the mental, i.e. to begin scientific investi-
gations. This kind of realism is independent of the interpretation of folk psychology. A
realist interpretation, being committed to the fact-stating character of the discourse, creates
a competitive tension between scientific and folk psychology as two incompatible
descriptions of the same phenomena. Realism about mental entities suggests the possibility
that folk psychology may not be an ideal tool for satisfying our epistemic curiosity, as here
it has to compete with empirical research, and its resources may not fit the task. But, being
untouched by questions of interpretation, it also affords the chance to separate empirical
research and folk psychology—if the latter is not interpreted as a fact-stating discourse.
5 The Realism-Antirealism Debate
Having drawn the distinction in this way between two kinds of mental realism, the usual
content of realist and antirealist positions is reworked to some extent. If it is related to
realism about mental entities, Millikan’s dictum quoted at the beginning of this paper
seems right: there is only one possible way in which both realism and antirealism can be
put. Realism and antirealism are both definite doctrines: they make or refuse ontological
commitment respectively, and there is no third option. One could perhaps say that it is
possible to suspend judgement about whether to make an ontological commitment or not,
but this is neither realism nor antirealism: this is agnosticism which is not part of the
debate. It seems to belong more to the problem of how ontological commitment emerges:
the question why or why not someone believes in, or suspends judgement about, the
existence of witches or mental states is not a philosophical one; it belongs more to soci-
ology or psychology. In the case of interpretation neither realist nor antirealist positions
are definite. Although realists are committed to the fact-stating character of a given dis-
course, while antirealists deny it, both options can take various forms, since discourses can
be interpreted as fact-stating, and it can be denied that they are, in a variety of forms.
The only claim that realist interpretations of discourses have in common is that the truth
of its propositions is systematically connected to relevant facts. Nonetheless, it is
3 Williams (1993: 33 f.) reaches essentially the same insight when he points out that the concept of
‘intention’ is missing in Homer. However, instead of drawing the conclusion that precisely for this reason
the concepts of ‘person’ and ‘action’ must also be substantially different from the ones we apply today, he
tries to argue that although the concept is missing, the ‘‘idea’’ of intention is still there in Homer.
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frequently doubted that realism entails commitment to the fact-stating character of a dis-
course. In the present context, Daly’s (2005) argument can be considered as saying that a
mental realist can think of the world as containing mental entities but lacking truth-making
entities for folk-psychological propositions. Positions like this accept realism about mental
entities while denying realism about folk psychology. But if we take psychological
propositions as representing how things are in the represented region of the world, then
their truth depends obviously on how things are in that region—i.e. a realist interpretation
links the truth of the propositions in question to relevant facts. The case is different with
realism about entities which does not entail any semantic commitment, not even that their
representation is possible at all.
The realism-antirealism debate usually focuses on whether or not semantic and epis-
temological considerations are primary in questions of existence (cf. Devitt 1991; Dum-
mett 1991). In this respect, realism about entities is close to Devitt’s (1991: 3 f.) position
that decision in questions of metaphysics should precede semantic and epistemological
questions; thus a commitment to the existence of some entities does not bear on the
meaning and truth of propositions. When viewed from the angle of realist interpretation,
realism does not imply holding true (or mostly true) the propositions of the discourse
interpreted in a realist way. A realist interpretation is compatible with the view that the
propositions in a discourse are false—this is the view of eliminativism in the philosophy of
mind, and error-theory in ethics (cf. Mackie 1977: 48 ff.).
Drawing a distinction between two kinds of realism is always possible if it makes
sense to say that the acceptance of a given proposition does not depend on how things
stand in the world putatively represented by the discourse to which it belongs. This is a
position frequently argued for in ethics and aesthetics, and I shall suggest that it is
possible to argue this way about folk psychology too. Furthermore, it is possible to make
this case concerning science. Given the present distinction, everyone interprets science
realistically as long as they accept that it is a fact-stating discourse. Thus constructive
empiricism (cf. van Fraassen 1980: 11 ff.) can also be read as a kind of realism, which
does not question that the propositions of the discourse aim at describing the world. It
only says that in some part of the discourse, i.e. the one about unobservable entities,
there are standards of acceptance that are different from those in another part which is
about observable entities. In the former part the basis of acceptance is empirical ade-
quacy, the fact that our theories about unobservables explain observable phenomena.
Propositions about unobservables are systematically connected to observations which are
the basis of acceptance of these propositions. So, scientific discourse has epistemic
virtues and constructive empiricism shows that the acceptance of statements about
unobservables is based not on accessing the relevant facts but on calculating them on the
basis of observable phenomena.
The difference between constructive empiricism and the views van Fraassen thinks are
realist is not due to their different views about the nature of the discourse but about the
nature of the facts on which acceptance is based. Whereas, for a constructive empiricist,
sentences can be literally true, their acceptance does not hang on the truth of the propo-
sition they express, but on another pragmatically equivalent proposition. Acceptance
depends not on facts about unobservables, but on a set of facts, or on the truth of a complex
proposition, about observables. Therefore, the acceptance of sentences about the unob-
servable domain remains systematically connected to truths about observables, but they
state different facts.
Antirealism in this context would be a position that science is not fact-stating. It could
hold, for instance, that its aims are not epistemic but ideological: it serves the purposes of
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disguising and maintaining certain forms of social power. Habermas (1970), for example,
sketches a picture of science as representing itself as objective knowledge standing above
ideologies. Thus science itself becomes an ideology in terms of which an increasing
number of problems require technical solutions. In doing so, it makes practical social
problems less visible and thus serves particular class interests. This process is enhanced by
mass media, educational institutions, labour associations, and channels of communica-
tion—agencies distorted by science that together enable the ruling classes to maintain their
social power. This is an antirealist interpretation of the scientific discourse which denies
that it aims at describing facts in the world and determines its function by a reconstruction
of its social role which is alien to its realist interpretations. But even if this view is
accepted, one can still maintain that the entities postulated by science exist— only science
is ill-suited to tell truths about them.
6 Folk Psychology and Scientific Psychology
It is frequently taken for granted that both folk psychology and cognitive science aim at the
prediction and explanation of behaviour, so they are about the same thing (cf. Stich 1978).
Therefore they have to be reconciled with one another, or one of them should be eliminated
for the sake of the other. But it makes sense to believe that this is a false dilemma.
Separating realism about folk psychology and about mental entities gives us a chance for
separating the fields of inquiry where they are in charge, which promotes peaceful coex-
istence. Besides, it thus becomes possible to investigate the features of folk psychological
features and to revise its common-sense view if necessary, without bearing on scientific
psychology at all.
Basically, ascriptions of mental states are made in two contexts: on the one hand, in the
explanation and prediction of behaviour, i.e. in epistemic contexts; on the other, in making
moral judgements, i.e. in evaluative contexts. Giving up the idea that folk psychology is in
some sense a fact-stating discourse amounts to withdrawing from its epistemic uses, and
resolving the competitive tension between folk psychology and scientific psychology in the
explanation of mental entities and of behaviour. If mental entities are treated as belonging
to natural kinds, then research on them does not presuppose or require anything from the
conceptual resources of folk psychology. Once viewed from this angle, scientific psy-
chology focuses with its technical concepts on explanation and prediction, while folk
psychology turns out to be the discourse offering concepts necessary for understanding and
evaluating persons in the social world. Thus we give up the idea of folk-psychological
explanation and prediction of behaviour, but retain the practice of folk-psychological
interpretation—if it is reconstructed in a way so as not to rely on the alleged epistemic uses
of the discourse.
A promising way of doing this is to take a fictionalist stance towards folk psychology,
modelled on moral fictionalism (cf. e.g. Joyce 2001; Kalderon 2005), of which I can only
give a sketchy outline here. The central claim of fictionalist poisitions consists in the
conjunction of the following three theses:
(a) Folk psychological sentences express propositions.
(b) As such they are truth evaluable.
(c) Truth value is not their essential property.
Now, (a) distinguishes fictionalism from expressivism, and up to (b) it goes hand in
hand with error theory (or eliminativism), but with (c) it diverges from it. The fictionalist
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account thus holds that folk psychology provides representations that may not represent
anything, and whose virtues are not epistemic.
From this angle, folk psychology can be taken to be an everyday hermeneutic device
facilitating non-epistemic understanding. Representing the springs of behaviour by well-
known concepts of folk psychology amounts to representing it as coherent and meaningful,
as behaviour that makes sense. This kind of understanding can be seen on par with, e.g.
understanding extreme bad weather as a result of the activity of witches: it can provide
affective resolution in those cases where unfamiliar events take place, but without pro-
viding knowledge about it. Also, by representing behaviour with folk psychological con-
cepts it becomes morally evaluable. Behaviour is thus represented as an action of a person,
and not as a simple event in an impersonal causal chain. Moral evaluation needs this kind
of representation, otherwise behaviour cannot be seen as a person’s action, only as an event
happening to her. Due to the evaluative language of motivations and intentions, folk
psychological representations can be used to express and influence moral sentiments.
A good model of how folk psychological sentences can do that could start from
Davidson’s (1978) account of metaphors (putting aside the question if it is correct as a
theory of metaphors), which Kalderon (2005: 127 ff.), too, uses for making a fictionalist
sense of moral sentences. According to this view, moral sentences are quasi-assertions that
do not assert a proposition at all but convey some noncognitive attitude. Prima facie, folk
psychological sentences, just like moral sentences, seem to express fact-stating proposi-
tions. Still, for the fictionalist, it is not their semantic content that is relevant for an
understanding of what role they really play, but a kind of non-semantic, affective content.
This content is not entirely independent from the semantics of the sentences, as the con-
ventions of folk psychological discourse (generally known as the platitudes of folk psy-
chology) stabilise the use of its expressions. For the fictionalist, folk psychology is a
convention-based expressive code with purely social uses, and not a metarepresentational
device that could tell truths about our cognitive architecture.
If understood in this way, neither the hermeneutic nor the evaluative uses of folk
psychological representations presuppose their truth, only their ability to express and cause
the relevant sentiments. On the face of it, they are representations, but their use does not
rely on the truth of their representational content. Although they may not be true repre-
sentations, they still can play an important role in social interaction: due to their affective
content they can motivate behaviour, but not as a result of calculating with propositional
attitude ascriptions, but by conveying sentiments. In this sense, folk psychology is a useful
ideology that introduces us as coherent and moral agents, and makes the social world
liveable—but does not serve the purposes of the true representation of the causes of
behaviour.
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